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Macroeconomic shocks, human capital and productive efficiency: 
Evidence from West African rice farmers 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract: Little empirical work has quantified the transitory effects of macroeconomic 
shocks on farm-level production behavior.  We develop a simple analytical model 
to explain how macroeconomic shocks might temporarily divert managerial 
attention, thereby affecting farm-level productivity, but perhaps to different 
degrees and for different durations across production units.  We then successfully 
test hypotheses from that model using panel data bracketing massive currency 
devaluation in the west African nation of Côte d’Ivoire.  We find a transitory 
increase in mean plot-level technical inefficiency among Ivorien rice producers 
and considerable variation in the magnitude and persistence of this effect, 
attributable largely to ex ante complexity of operations, and the educational 
attainment and off-farm employment status of the plot manager.  
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I. Introduction 
 Although economies do not move instantly from one long-term equilibrium to another, 
most empirical and theoretical analysis focuses on comparative statics and the long-term general 
equilibrium effects of macroeconomic shocks.  Relatively little attention has been paid to the 
response paths followed by individual producers as they adjust from one equilibrium to another, 
and particularly not to empirical assessment of the dynamic response of small farmers 
responding to major policy shocks in low-income economies.  Yet smallholders’ response to 
potentially long periods of disequilibrium may have important aggregate effects on output and 
rural poverty in low-income agrarian economies undertaking major macroeconomic reforms.   
  There may also be predictable variation in dynamic responses across individuals.  
Schultz (1964, 1975) hypothesized that the ability to deal with disequilibrium induced by 
economic shocks is largely a function of education, with better educated individuals adjusting 
more successfully than less educated agents.  The basic idea is simple and intuitive; appropriate 
adjustment to shocks requires the collection and processing of new information, and better 
educated individuals would be expected, on average, to excel at such tasks.  Schultz’s primary 
interest was technological shocks, but his point applies more broadly. Yet, despite the plethora of 
macroeconomic adjustment programs in low- and middle-income economies over the past two 
decades, we are unaware of any studies of interhousehold differences in the rate or extent of 
recovery from producer-level disequilibria potentially induced by macroeconomic shocks.   
 An obvious reason for the dearth of empirical testing of the Schultzian hypothesis, or of 
the effects of macro shocks on producer behavior more broadly, has been a lack of panel 
production data straddling a major shock.  One must be able to identify cross-sectional 
differences in observational units’ intertemporal changes in behavior and performance.  In this 
paper we use a 1993-95 panel data set of rice farmers in the west African nation of Côte d’Ivoire, 
straddling the massive devaluation of that country’s currency in 1994, to test (i) whether the 
macroeconomic shock is manifest at the microeconomic level in the plot-level technical 
efficiency of producers, (ii) whether there exist identifiable cross-sectional differences in the 
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immediate impact of the shock, and (iii) whether the Schultzian hypothesis holds, that education 
is an important determinant of cross-sectional differences in subsequent recovery.   
 Our strategy in this paper is to start, in section II, by building a simple analytical model 
wherein a sharp change in the external economic environment (e.g., product and factor price 
ratios) diverts managerial attention from directly productive tasks in order to make sense of 
changes in the broader economic environment.  We hypothesize that this diversion may have a 
measurable effect on productivity that could vary predictably across farmers.  Section III then 
introduces the data we use to test these hypotheses.  We show that currency devaluation caused 
sharp changes in relative prices and price variability in rural Côte d’Ivoire, proving stimulative in 
aggregate to the nation’s rice sector, although yields per hectare fell.  Section IV then introduces 
the original econometric method we use to implement the analytical model, estimating a time-
invariant rice production frontier jointly with the correlates of plot-specific technical 
inefficiency, specified so as to enable us to test directly for intertemporal changes in technical 
inefficiency in the wake of the macroeconomic shock. Section V reports our estimation results.  
We find that technical inefficiency increased immediately following the shock, then recovered 
somewhat the subsequent year.  There exists significant cross-sectional variation in estimated 
technical inefficiency changes, for example with respect to farmer educational attainment and 
off-farm employment status, and  the complexity of the farming operation.  Section V concludes 
with some thoughts on the micro-level dynamics of adjustment to macro-level policy reforms, 
how those dynamics may vary across households and the implications for the design of policy 
reforms.  
 
II. A Model of Farm Manager Response to Macroeconomic Shock 
 First we construct a simple reduced form model of producer behavior in which 
exogenous shocks may temporarily divert managerial attention, thereby reducing unobservable 
labor quality and yielding an increase in estimated technical inefficiency on the farm.  The 
shock’s immediate impact and intertemporal propagation is conditional on individuals’ exposure 
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to the shock and on their capacity to deal with disequilibrium, hence the possibility of cross-
sectional differences in the initial impact of the shock and in the rate of recovery from any 
shock-induced effects.  The analytical model yields testable hypotheses with respect to (i) the 
effects of a uniform exogenous (e.g., macroeconomic or technological) shock on mean producer 
technical inefficiency, as commonly estimated using labor allocation (i.e., time) data that cannot 
control for unobservable managerial attention (i.e., labor quality), (ii) characteristics that will 
cause cross-sectional variation in the extent of the disruptions manifest as increased estimated 
technical inefficiency, and (iii) the effects of human capital, education in particular, on the extent 
and pace of recovery from temporary efficiency disruptions.  We will test those hypotheses 
econometrically in the subsequent section. 
 We start with a standard, basic model of a household that maximizes utility subject to a 
budget constraint, a time availability constraint, and a technology constraint.  The latter is the 
focus of attention in this paper.1  Let the variables y, a, l, and x represent output, area, labor, and 
variable non-labor inputs, respectively, with the function f(.) mapping the latter three into the 
former such that y  f(a,l,x) with f(.) monotone in each argument.  In theory, this constraint binds 
at all optima, so that in long-run equilibrium, optimizing producers should exhibit perfect 
technical efficiency, y = f(a,l,x). Nonetheless, most empirical studies find evidence of technical 
inefficiency, i.e., that yi= f(ai ,li,xi )-ui  with ui a non-negative, plot-specific technical inefficiency 
parameter, strictly positive for most plots (Ali and Byerlee 1991).2 
 In distinguishing between managers and manual laborers, economists have long 
                                                          
1 In the interests of brevity, we do not present a fully specified household behavioral model of constrained utility 
maximization.  The results of the simpler, reduced form model we present follow directly from such a model under 
the assumption that the returns to spending a unit of scarce time collecting and processing information in the wake 
of a macroeconomic shock is at least equal to the opportunity cost of labor, equal to roughly US$0.60/day at 
prevailing unskilled agricultural wages.  Given how pervasive long discussions about the consequences of FCFA 
devaluation were in rural Côte d’Ivoire following the shock, this seems a very mild assumption. 
2 There is some reason to suspect that econometric error may substantially overstate smallholder technical 
inefficiency in much of the literature (Ali and Byerlee 1991, Barrett 1997, Sherlund et al. 2002).  The problem of 
interpreting estimated technical inefficiency parameters lies at the heart of this paper since our model ultimately 
revolves around the unobservability of managerial attention.  
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implicitly recognized that effective labor is effectively a composite of two distinct inputs: time 
spent in physical work (w) and managerial attention to that work (m).  Let us represent this 
relationship by the function l(w,m), which is strictly monotonically increasing in both arguments, 
reflecting the basic idea that work on which one is concentrating is more productive than either 
thought without physical effort or thoughtless activity.  The physical and the cognitive 
dimensions of labor can be pursued simultaneously.  While undertaking the physical work 
required on a plot, a farmer may concentrate on the tasks at hand and get them done efficiently.  
Or he may spend some of his measurable labor time thinking about things other than the current 
task, including matters that affect the farm, such as the effects of changing relative prices on 
input procurement and output sales patterns, next period’s crop choice, etc.   The (partial) 
diversion of managerial attention away from the immediate, menial task at hand might affect the 
quality of the manual labor undertaken and thereby productivity.   
 The imperfect relationship between time expended in physical work, w, and effective 
labor effort, l, underpins the vast literature on moral hazard in agricultural labor markets, in 
which hired workers are understood as able to reduce their effective labor effort without reducing 
the time they spend working, i.e., to shirk.  Here we apply the same basic concept with a 
somewhat different twist.  Rather than shirking as hired laborers might, owner-managers may 
have their attention temporarily diverted by exogenous events that require concentrated thought 
that can nonetheless be undertaken, perhaps at an efficiency cost, while performing other, more 
menial tasks.  Such exogenous events might include macroeconomic or sectoral reforms that 
cause substantial swings in relative price ratios.   
 This issue of partial diversion of attention becomes important because only the physical 
work time of the farmer is directly measurable.  Empirical studies inevitably use w to proxy for l.  
Since w and m are highly correlated with one another in owner-operated businesses like 
smallholder agriculture, and since both increase effective labor power, econometric estimates of 
the parameters of the production frontier estimated using w in place of l(w,m) will be susceptible 
to omitted relevant variables bias.  For present purposes, however, the point on which we wish to 
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focus is that when economic policy shocks distract managerial attention, effective labor input 
may decrease, yielding lower output for the same time spent in physical work.  When w proxies 
for l(w,m), this reduction in output will appear as a deviation from the production frontier, i.e., as 
an increase in estimated technical inefficiency, ui.  Given inability to measure directly m or its 
effect on output, we can understand u(m) as a weakly monotonically decreasing function of m.3 
 If exogenous shocks divert decision-makers’ attention from directly productive activities 
as they collect and process information, weigh alternative courses of action, search for new 
buyers or suppliers, or some combination of these, then shocks may have transitorily adverse 
effects on productivity.4  We can formalize this idea by representing the farm-level supply of  
managerial attention by the function  m(φit, cit, oit, hit).  The individual-specific shock effect felt 
by decision-maker i at time t, φit, is nonnegative.  The nonnegativity of φit is arbitrary; one could 
equally make it nonpositive.  The key is that the measure allows for no effect and that any 
environmental or exogenous shock, whether it increases or decreases welfare, requires some 
attention.  It is important not to confuse welfare effects with the shock’s inducement of 
behavioral response.  The variable c is a nonnegative measure of the complexity of the 
manager’s operations (e.g., the number of crops grown or the share of area planted in improved 
cultivars requiring careful management), o measures the off-farm work responsibilities of the 
decision-maker, and h is a measure of the manager’s human capital endowment.  Assume 
managerial attention is increasing in h and decreasing in the other three arguments. 
 The magnitude of the unobservable, individual-specific shock, φit, is itself a function of 
the complexity of the operation being managed and of the human capital of the manager.  In the 
case of agriculture, for example, as the share of area under modern varieties dependent on 
                                                          
3  u(m) is weakly monotone because u is bounded from below at zero.  
4 Because the data we use are not well suited to investigating questions of allocative efficiency (for reasons we 
explain later), we ignore the question of changes in allocative efficiency in response to policy shocks.  One could 
understand the phenomenon of transitory technical inefficiency due to the diversion of managerial attention as the 
short-term price managers pay for subsequent gains in allocative efficiency that result from managers having 
thought through the implications of changes in their environment while doing their menial work.     
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purchased inputs (e.g., seed, fertilizer, pesticides) increases, so does the dimensionality of the 
information collection and processing and contracting tasks faced by the smallholder, so a shock 
should have greater effect on those managing more complex enterprises.  The effect of human 
capital, especially education, is qualitatively different in that it doesn’t affect the magnitude of 
the immediate shock but rather the rate at which the shock’s effects dissipate.  Literacy, 
numeracy, and logical abilities are no shield against disruption, but they certainly help 
individuals respond quickly and effectively to shocks by gathering and processing information 
efficiently and accurately (Huffman 2002).   
 These relationships can be captured in the linear state equation,  
    φit = ρφit-1 + αhitφit-1 + citεt (1) 
where ρ is a positive first-order autoregressive parameter capturing the intertemporal propagation 
of the shock conditional on i’s human capital endowment, α captures the effect of human capital 
on the shock’s propagation, and εt ≥0 is a cross-sectionally uniform exogenous shock, like a 
macroeconomic policy reform or the introduction of a new production technology.  The 
Schultzian hypothesis suggests α<0, that human capital accelerates recovery from the distraction 
caused by an exogenous shock.  In this framework, ρ+αhit=0 implies full recovery after only one 
period. 
 The effects of a common shock, t , on the managerial attention of the ith operator at time t, 
mit, may therefore vary over time.  The effects may emerge through any of several parallel 
transmission channels: 
 
 ∂mit/∂εt = ∂m/∂φit·cit + ∂m/∂cit·∂cit/∂ε t + ∂m/∂oit·∂oit/∂ε t + ∂m/∂hit·∂hit/∂εt   (2) 
∂mit+1/∂εt = ∂m/∂φit·cit(ρ+ αhit)+∂m/∂cit·∂cit+1/∂εt+∂m/∂oit·∂oit+1/∂ε t+∂m/∂hit·∂hit+1/∂εt  (3) 
By the weak monotonicity of u in m, the effect of a common shock, t, on plot- and period-
specific technical inefficiency will vary across individual operators and time periods: 
 ∂uit/∂ε t = ∂u/∂m [∂m/∂φit·cit + ∂m/∂cit·∂cit/∂εt + ∂m/∂oit·∂oit/∂ε t + ∂m/∂hit·∂hit/∂ε t]  (4) 
 
 ∂uit+1/∂εt = ∂u/∂m[∂m/∂φ·cit (ρ+αhit)+ ∂m/∂cit·∂cit+1/∂εt+∂m/∂oit·∂oit+1/∂εt +∂m/∂hit·∂hit+1/∂εt](5) 
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Under the assumptions that ∂hit/∂εt = ∂cit/∂εt = ∂oit/∂εt = 0, i.e., that neither the manager’s stock 
of human capital, nor the complexity of her operations nor off-farm employment responsibilities 
change instantaneously, the effect of a uniform common shock, εt, on contemporaneous 
estimated technical inefficiency should be positive because it reduces managerial attention and 
therefore labor productivity. The induced increase in technical inefficiency should be greater for 
managers overseeing more complex operations and somewhat less for those who reduce off-farm 
employment (e.g., in the nontradable service sector) in response to real exchange rate 
depreciation.   
 The difference of equations (5)-(4) identifies the factors affecting plot-level recovery in 
technical inefficiency (i.e., in output or yields, ceteris paribus):  
 (∂uit+1/∂ε t -∂uit/∂εt ) = ∂u/∂m [∂m/∂φit·cit (ρ+αhit -1) + ∂m/∂cit(∂cit+1/∂εt - ∂cit/∂εt ) + 
     ∂m/∂oit(∂oit+1/∂εt - ∂oit/∂εt ) + ∂m/∂hit(∂hit+1/∂εt - ∂hit/∂εt)] (6) 
Assume the shock has no effect on human capital, so the last parenthetical expression in (6) 
equals zero, and that  is negative, as predicted by Schultz.  Then recovery in technical 
inefficiency is greatest (i.e., the value of (6) is lower) for managers with more human capital or 
who reallocate time from off-farm obligations in response to the shock, as reflected in the first 
and third parenthetical expressions, respectively, on the righthand side of equation (6).  If the 
shock induces an increase (decrease) in the complexity of the operation, technical inefficiency 
will increase (decrease).  This simple analytical model yields several hypotheses which we test in 
section III. 
 To summarize graphically, we hypothesize that devaluation induces a sharp adjustment in 
relative prices, depicted in stylized form in Figure 1 as a pivoting of the price line about the 
production frontier.  But the diversion of managerial attention may cause producers to move 
from the old equilibrium at E0 to a new long-run equilibrium at EL in two or more steps.  
Omitting, for the sake of brevity, the possibility of temporary allocative inefficiency,5 the 
                                                          
5 In Figure 1, allocative inefficiency would appear as selection of a point on the production frontier other than the 
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response path of our stylized producer to the common exogenous shock, may involve an 
intermediate step to a point of disequilibrium within the production frontier, such as D1.  The 
location of D1 relative to the production frontier and the rate at which the producer thereafter 
approaches EL – in other words the magnitude and persistence of induced transitory technical 
inefficiency – depend on the characteristics just discussed: the manager’s human capital and off-
farm employment responsibilities and the complexity of the operation.  The implication is that 
output will steadily increase as the producer moves from Y0 to YL, but yield (reflected in the 
slope of the line segment connecting the origin to the production point) initially falls before 
recovering.  As the next section describes, this is precisely the pattern we observe in the rice 
sector of Côte d’Ivoire following the 1994 currency devaluation.  
 This line of reasoning builds on a literature on the “human capital approach to allocative 
efficiency” that emerged in the 1970s among Chicago students of Becker, Griliches and Schultz.  
That literature emphasized the central role of education in achieving allocative efficiency, above 
all in agriculture (Griliches 1963, Welch 1970, 1978; Fane 1975; Huffman 2002; Ram 1980).  Its 
focus was on the role of education in an environment of technological change, as was appropriate 
in post-war United States agriculture and during the Green Revolution abroad.  More recently, 
technology shocks have been less common than policy shocks in low-income agriculture, so our 
focus differs because the context of disequilibrium has changed.  The earlier literature also 
generally assumed perfect technical efficiency and introduced education directly into the 
production function as an input.  Our approach accommodates the empirical regularity of 
estimated technical inefficiency.  More importantly, it allows us to identify education’s period-
specific value in helping producers adjust to shocks.  As Schultz (1964, 1975) famously posited, 
human capital probably matters little to stable, traditional production, but becomes valuable to 
those dealing with disequilibrium.  So we opt to estimate instead producers’ technical 
inefficiency and then check whether human capital has an effect on the magnitude of the initial 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
point of tangency with the relative price line. 
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shock, the recovery from the shock, or both. 
 
III. Data and the FCFA Devaluation 
 We use data from the farm management and household survey (FMHS) fielded by the 
West Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA) to test the hypotheses developed in 
section II.  The WARDA FMHS tracked 120 randomly selected rice-producing households in 
Côte d’Ivoire, 1993-95, yielding 464 different rice plot observations.  Surveys consisting of 22 
different questionnaire modules were administered annually and are described in detail in 
WARDA (1997). 
 The WARDA FMHS data set is uniquely suited to this question of the micro-level 
responses to macro-level shocks.  After 46 years’ unchanged 50:1 parity against the French 
franc, the 14 members of the Communauté Financière Africaine devalued their common 
currency, the CFA franc (FCFA), by 100 percent in January 1994, between the first and second 
years of this survey.  While devaluation was widely anticipated, the extent and timing of the 
event were nonetheless a substantial shock to residents of the FCFA economies.  For some 
months thereafter, there was considerable uncertainty, discussion and reflection as to how prices 
would change and what implications this had for farmers’ livelihood strategies. 
 The FCFA devaluation aimed to correct price distortions caused by an overvalued 
currency and thereby to induce change in input and output choices and to stimulate tradables 
sectors such as rice.  In the FMHS survey regions, the nominal local market price of local variety 
rice increased 47.9 percent from 1993 to 1995 (Table 1).  This reflected a real increase in the rice 
price, as manifest by a 49.2 percent increase in the ratio of the rice price to the price of yams, a 
locally nontradable food.  Since nontradable labor and land are the major costs of rice production 
in Côte d’Ivoire, devaluation increased incentives for producers to bring additional inputs into 
rice cultivation in spite of increased real prices for tradable inputs (e.g., chemicals).  Good 
standardized input price series are not available in the FMHS data, but using labor markets 
transactions data we estimate that the ratio of the rice price to the adult male wage rate increased 
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significantly (16.8 percent) from 1993 to 1995.  Predictably, area under rice cultivation, the size 
of rice plots, the amount of labor used, and even chemical use were significantly higher in 1995 
as compared to 1993.6  Nationally, rice output increased 17.5 percent between 1993 and 1995 in 
Côte d’Ivoire (FAO 1999). Devaluation plainly stimulated rice production in Côte d’Ivoire. 
 Although rice output increased in response to devaluation,  yields among traditional 
Ivorien rice farmers declined sharply after the devaluation, from a mean (median) of 2.16 metric 
tons/hectare (1.86 t/ha) in 1993 to 1.75 t/ha (1.66 t/ha) in 1994.  Yields recovered somewhat in 
1995, to a mean of 1.99 t/ha (and a median of 1.95 t/ha).  Parts of the country experienced 
significantly lower rainfall in 1994 than in either 1993 or 1995, so natural, rather than policy 
shocks are surely at least partly responsible for the lower yields.  But when we control for 
rainfall and other time-varying natural variables (pest abundance, plant disease, etc.), there 
remain statistically significant, year-specific yield effects (Sherlund et al. 2002).  This paper 
explores whether the apparent transitory yield shocks might reflect micro-level disequilibrium 
dynamics of the sort posited in the preceding section. 
 Knowing that area under cultivation increased following devaluation, it is plausible that a 
yield decline could be attributable to extensification onto less fertile land.  But the FMHS 
includes detailed biophysical information on plots – soil fertility, slope, etc. – enabling us to 
control for any such change in the subsequent frontier estimation.  Moreover, extensification 
would be inconsistent with the transitory nature of observed yield declines.7 
 The price data support the claim that exchange rate devaluation can induce temporary 
uncertainty that might divert managerial attention.  Figure 2 shows the evolution of 13-month 
centered moving average prices for locally produced rice, as well as the time path of the 
                                                          
6 We compare 1995 against 1993 because stickiness in price adjustments and asynchronous agricultural calendars – 
some farms made irreversible production decisions before the price effects of devaluation had played out fully – 
make comparison of 1994 to 1993 less informative than 1993-1995 comparisons.  That said, the qualitative result 
holds for the 1993-1994 comparison as well: nominal and real rice prices and input application rates increased. 
7 It could be consistent with the transitory drop in yields if land expansion preceded the observed increase in 
application of other (yield-increasing) inputs.  But that was not the case.  The data show the pace of input expansion 
was roughly equiproportional across measured inputs 1993-94 and 1994-95. 
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coefficient of variation of those prices.8  One sees a clear shock to the relative (much less 
absolute) variation of the rice price series, beginning with devaluation in early 1994.  The 
coefficient of variation in rice prices increased sharply for a period of almost a year before 
settling down at a new, higher level.9  Our own casual conversations with Ivorien smallholders 
reveal that they indeed spent much time mulling over the implications of this shock and the 
resulting uncertainty.  So while it cannot be directly corroborated empirically, the sort of 
managerial attention diversion that we model in the abstract indeed appears plausible. 
 By way of a brief tangent, we note that this model also offers an alternative way to 
understand the empirical regularity of short-run price elasticities of crop supply that are 
significantly lower than the corresponding long-run price elasticities  (Askari and Cummings 
1976, Rao 1989).  Typically, the deviation of short-run from long-run elasticities is attributed to 
quasi-fixed factors of production (e.g., land), adaptive expectations formation, or unspecified 
convex adjustment costs.  We do not challenge these other, quite sensible explanations.  Because 
it explicitly introduces adjustment dynamics, however, the present model offers another, 
complementary explanation of the oft-observed phenomenon.10  In our model, there are no 
expectations, no quasi-fixed factors, and convexity is not imposed on the explicitly identified 
source of the adjustment costs. 
 
IV. Estimation Methods 
 In order to test the hypotheses developed earlier, we jointly estimate a stochastic 
                                                          
8 The underlying data are series for each of the three survey regions (Boundiali, Gagnoa, and Waninou).  The figure 
depicts the unweighted, arithmetic average of the series.  The qualitative point holds for the series individually, as 
well. 
9 This pattern is consistent with theory and empirical evidence that devaluation increases the variance of stochastic 
price series more than the mean when devaluation induces a shift in the underlying market equilibrium condition 
from an importable to a nontradable (Barrett 1999). 
10 One could presumably test this new explanation by checking the symmetry of the short-run/long-run differential 
to positive and negative price shocks.  Conventional models would predict symmetric differentials, while ours would 
predict asymmetric differentials, with output overshooting the downward adjustment in response to a fall in relative 
output prices.  Since the FMHS data include only price increases, we cannot explore this issue further in these data. 
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production frontier and correlates of technical inefficiency in Ivorien rice production.  As a 
result, we also derive plot-specific estimates of technical inefficiency.  Correlates of technical 
inefficiency include farmer-specific characteristics hypothesized to affect the extent and 
persistence of transitory technical inefficiency.11  Since there is no reason to believe that a 
discrete change to relative prices would fundamentally change a traditional production 
technology over a year or two, and because the intertemporal comparisons on which we focus 
require a common reference point, we estimate a time-invariant production frontier.    
 The empirical production frontier literature generally follows one of two methods.  The 
preponderance of the published literature follows the stochastic production frontier (SPF) 
approach independently pioneered by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van 
den Broeck (1977).  In this approach, one specifies a priori a functional form for the production 
frontier (e.g., Cobb-Douglas or translog) defining output (Y) as a function of variable (X) and 
fixed or exogenous (W) variables and probability density functions for the asymmetric technical 
inefficiency parameter, u (typically the half-normal or truncated normal), and the symmetric 
statistical error parameter, v (usually the normal).  Letting i index plots and t index growing 
seasons, the SPF specification is thus  Yit = f(Xit, Wit) – uit + vit.  Then the (log-) likelihood 
function may be written out and maximum likelihood used to estimate the parameters of interest.   
 The second approach uses nonparametric, data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to 
impose monotonicity and concavity properties on the estimated frontier and otherwise make no 
functional form or distributional assumptions about the shape of the production frontier.  This 
flexibility comes at the considerable cost, however, of an assumed absence of measurement or 
                                                          
11 Because managers may be aware of their technical inefficiency and adjust input applications accordingly, 
estimating the primal production function may introduce simultaneity bias.  However, if the market level price data 
available are weakly related to the true shadow prices guiding farmer decisions in an environment of considerable 
transactions costs, risk, quality variation, etc., then price observations will introduce errors in variables problems in 
estimation of dual cost or profit functions.  Since price recordation occurred only at regional level in the FMHS data 
set and many plots’ inputs (e.g., child labor, adult family labor, land, animal traction, soil quality, slope) were not 
purchased and so have no observed prices associated with them, we opt for the primal method in the present analysis 
based on the belief that with adequate controls for farm-level production conditions, endogeneity bias related to 
inputs is likely considerably less than errors in variables bias related to prices in these data.  
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sampling error (Färe et al. 1994).12  We focus on the former, stochastic parametric approach, 
although an earlier version of this paper included DEA results that were qualitatively similar, 
indeed, even more striking in magnitude and statistical significance.  In short, our findings 
appear robust to the technical inefficiency estimation method employed. 
 Jondrow et al. (1982) show how to estimate the conditional expectation of the 
plot-specific technical efficiency parameter (conditional upon the composed error term, vi – ui) in 
stochastic parametric frontier estimation.  One problem with this approach, however, is that the 
technical inefficiency parameter is assumed to be independently and identically distributed.  This 
clearly is not the case if we suspect (and find) that the technical inefficiency parameter is related 
to variables such as managerial characteristics and practices that vary across firms. 
 To combat this potential problem, some studies suggest estimating the production frontier 
and the relationship between technical inefficiency and the sources of inefficiency jointly, rather 
than in a two-step procedure.  Kumbhakar et al. (1991) generalize the stochastic production 
frontier model of Aigner, et al. by specifying that the distribution of the technical inefficiency 
parameter be the positive truncation of a normal distribution with variable mean Zi δ, i.e., ui ~ 
N+(Zi δ, σ2u), where δ is a vector of parameters to be estimated.  Reifschneider and Stevenson 
(1991) instead propose that ui = Ziδ + ξi ≥0, where ξi ~ N+(0, σ2ξ).  But the latter method does not 
guarantee that ui ≥0.  Huang and Liu (1994) take a slightly different approach.  They specify ξi ~ 
N(0, σ2ξ) and truncate this from below at the variable truncation point, – Zi δ.  Huang and Liu also 
allow for interactions between the productive inputs and the managerial variables in the technical 
inefficiency relationship. 
 Other studies have concentrated on the panel data aspects of production frontier 
estimation.  Pitt and Lee (1981) implement a random effects treatment to estimate a stochastic 
                                                          
12 The output-oriented, variable returns to scale, strong disposability DEA model may be written: 2*(X i,Yi 
|VRS,SD) = Max2,z 2, subject to 2Yi #zY, zX # Xi, 3i zi = 1, and z 0 RN+, where i = 1,...,N and z is the activity 
vector indicating to which plots the ith plot is being compared.  The resulting output measure of technical efficiency 
is bounded from below at one, 2 $ 1, and represents the multiple by which output may be expanded, holding the 
input bundle constant, had the ith plot been fully efficient.  
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production frontier.  Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar (1990, 1991), Battese 
and Coelli (1992), and Lee and Schmidt (1993) allow the technical efficiency parameter to vary 
across time via time-specific dummy variables or according to a specified functional form.  But 
in these models, the technical inefficiency parameter is assumed to follow the same pattern over 
time for all firms.  Battese and Coelli (1995) generalize the model of Huang and Liu to allow for 
panel data, though not explicitly allowing for interactions between the inputs and managerial 
variables in the technical inefficiency relationship.  This model allows the technical inefficiency 
parameter, and hence technical efficiency, to vary across time in a potentially different, but 
predictable, manner across firms. 
 We implement Battese and Coelli’s model, wherein the technical inefficiency parameter 
is related to a vector of farmer-specific managerial variables subject to statistical error, so that uit 
= Zitδ + ξit ≥0, where ξit ~ N(0, σ2ξ), i indexes firms, and t indexes time.  But since uit ≥ 0, ξit ≥ – 
Zitδ so that the distribution of ξit is truncated from below at the variable truncation point, – Zitδ .  
The statistical error of the production frontier is assumed to be mean-zero, normally distributed 
with variance σ2v.  Then the log-likelihood function for the ith firm at time t takes the form  
 ln Lit = -½ [ln(2π) + ln(σ2)]-1/2σ2[Yit - f(Xit, Wit; β, θ)+Zitδ]2 - ln[Φ(dit)]+ ln[Φ(dit*)] (7) 
where f(Xit, Wit; β, θ) is the production frontier, β, θ,δ, γ and σ2 are the parameters to be 
estimated, dit = Zitδ/(γσ2)½, dit* = {(1 –γ) Zitδ – γ[yit – f(Xit, Wit; β, θ)]} / [γ(1 – γ) σ2]½, and Φ (·) 
denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  Note that, under this 
parameterization,  γ = σ2u / (σ2u + σ2v) and σ2 = σ2u + σ2v.   
 We use a translog specification for the production frontier, imposing separability between 
the X and W variables in order to conserve degrees of freedom:13  
                                                          
13 The presence of many zero-valued observations is troublesome.  The convention in much literature is to set ln(0) 
= 0.  However, due to observations taking on values in the range (0,1], setting ln(0) = 0 implicitly reorders 
observations with respect to that subspace.  So instead, we set ln(0) = ln (./10), where . is the smallest strictly 
positive observation in the sample.  We tried to address the problem of zero-valued observations instead through the 
use of other flexible functional forms, e.g., generalized Leontief, CES-CT-GL, and symmetric generalized 
McFadden, but all failed diagnostic tests for satisfaction of regularity conditions (Waldman 1982). 
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Rice production (Yit) is measured in kilograms.  The variable inputs (Xit) consist of land (in 
ares), various measures of labor (in hours) and chemical fertilizer (in kilograms), while Wit, 
includes the categorical variables for soil erosivity, soil fertility, soil aptitude, topographic 
location dummies and region-specific dummies, as well as continuous variables reflecting plot 
slope, pest infestation, weed density, weed height, plant disease, rainy days, and rainfall.  
Because both rainfall measures are common to all plots in a region, they also capture some year-
and-region-specific unobserved heterogeneity and should therefore be interpreted with care.    
 Since our inquiry focuses on the intertemporal response of plot-level technical 
inefficiency to a macroeconomic shock, we specify the technical inefficiency equation as: 
   uit = Zitδ1 + I93Zitδ2 + I95Zitδ3 + ξit  (9) 
where the indicator variables I93 and I95 equal one for 1993 and 1995 observations, respectively, 
and zero otherwise.  The vector of characteristics (Zit) affecting technical inefficiency include the 
proportion of area planted in modern rice varieties, years of rice cropping experience, the number 
of total crops cultivated, and dummy variables for completion of elementary school or secondary 
or tertiary education, married women, unmarried women,14 off-farm work in agriculture, off-
farm work outside of the agricultural sector, year and geographic region. This specification 
permits interpretation of theδ2 and δ3 estimates from equation (2) as year-on-year differences in 
technical inefficiency since ui94 -ui93  = -I93Zitδ2 and ui95 -ui94  = I95Zitδ3.  Based on the analytical 
                                                          
14 One needs to control for gender and marital status because rural Ivorien women are less educated than men.  
Absent control for gender, one could easily conflate gender bias among married adults (i.e., wives disproportionately 
bearing the adjustment costs of shocks) with the effects of educational attainment.  Only 4.6 percent of the women in 
our sample had even elementary school education, while almost 18 percent of the men had secondary level 
education or beyond.  Partly as a consequence, women rice farmers are far less likely to speak French, the language 
of the national market information service. So when price shocks come along, women may have to invest more 
effort in acquiring and processing information not directly accessible to them, especially because the extension 
system in Côte d’Ivoire exhibits considerable bias against women (Adesina and Djato 1997).  If married women in 
Ivorien society disproportionately bear the adjustment costs of shocks and women are also less educated on average, 
then failure to control for the gender could cause upward bias in the estimated effects of education on farmer 
performance. Indeed, when we dropped the gender dummy from our regressions, the coefficient estimate on the 
education variable increased significantly in each of the regressions. 
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model advanced in section II, we would expect the estimates of δ2 to include negative coefficient 
estimates on the complexity of the farming operation (share in modern varieties, number of 
crops).  We would likewise expect the δ3 estimates to include negative coefficients on 
educational attainment and experience, reflecting the salutary effects of human capital in dealing 
with disequilibrium, and on the off-farm non-agricultural employment dummy, since Ivorien 
farmers with jobs in the (largely nontradable) tertiary sector generally reallocated time from off-
farm employment towards farming, albeit while still maintaining off-farm employment for 
financial liquidity and risk management purposes (Barrett et al. 2001).   
 
V. Transitory Technical Inefficiency in Ivorien Rice Production 
 In the interests of brevity, we do not dwell on the full set of production frontier 
coefficient estimates, which are discussed in detail in Sherlund et al. (2002).  The results are 
intuitive and standard.  For example, plot-level output is strongly increasing in land, labor and 
chemical fertilizer, with hired labor and chemicals appearing to be substitutes.  Environmental 
conditions matter a great deal to rice output as well, with expected output decreasing in plant 
disease and pest incidence, weed density and height, and plot slope, and increasing in days of 
rain and rainfall volume, as well as in more favorable agroecological regions.  Instead, we move 
directly to explore the intertemporal patterns of technical inefficiency evident in these data and to 
test the hypotheses posed by the model of section II. 
 The first question concerns the evolution of plot-specific technical inefficiency in the 
wake of massive currency devaluation.  As hypothesized,  inefficiency increased from 1993 to 
1994 and recovered slightly in 1995.  Across the unbalanced panel of plots, mean output in 1993 
was 82.4 percent of the estimated plot-specific production frontier, but fell to 73.3 percent in 
1994 before partly recovering to 76.3 percent in 1995.   However, because some plots are put 
into or brought out of fallow or are combined or subdivided across years, we do not have an even 
panel at plot level.  Looking only at plots for which we have three consecutive annual 
observations, 65.3 suffered an increase in technical inefficiency between 1993 and 1994, and 
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67.7 percent enjoyed reduced technical inefficiency in 1995, relative to 1994.  Half the plots 
exhibited the three-year fall-recovery pattern hypothesized in section II, while only 17 percent 
had the opposite pattern.  Although nearly two-thirds of sample plots suffered increased technical 
inefficiency in 1994, immediately following the FCFA devaluation, almost eighty percent of 
those plots’ efficiency improved the following year. The general hypothesized pattern of a 
transitory increase in technical inefficiency in response to a macroeconomic shock seems 
supported by these data.  
 Our model not only predicts a temporary increase (decrease) in estimated technical 
inefficiency (output) on average, it also hypothesizes predictable cross-sectional differences in 
changes in inefficiency.  In particular, the initial, adverse managerial diversion effects of the 
shock should be felt most acutely on plots managed by operators who supervise relatively more 
complex operations or who have off-farm employment that gives them a place to collect 
information on changing market conditions and to reflect on the implications of these changes 
for their farming practices (rather than doing this only while farming).  We use the number of 
different crops under the control of the plot manager (crops) and the proportion of the plot 
planted in modern rice varieties (modern) to capture operational complexity.  Most operators did 
not change the complexity of their operations during the survey period.  So although our model 
suggests that the effect of the shock on complexity should itself affect the magnitude of the 
common shock’s effect on plot-and-period-specific technical inefficiency, we omit the change in 
complexity variable because it is clearly endogenous and we haven’t suitable instruments for 
predicting such changes.15  Similarly, we do not include changes in off-farm employment status 
since this is plainly endogenous and because change in off-farm employment was almost entirely 
infra-marginal, enjoying adjustments in hours worked rather than cessation or commencement of 
employment (Barrett et al. 2001). 
                                                          
15 As a check, we also ran regressions including change in crops, in plots, and in the proportion planted in modern 
varieties as regressors.  This specification, which likely suffers endogeneity bias, returned qualitatively identical 
results as the specification we report, which may suffer (modest) omitted relevant variables bias from the omission 
of these change variables.  The consistency of the results suggests the qualitative findings are robust. 
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 Although our model posits that human capital does not prevent farmers suffering the 
effects of shocks initially, it predicts that  higher levels of human capital should lead to faster 
recovery in technical inefficiency in the subsequent recovery period, from 1994 to 1995.  We use 
the operator’s rice farming experience (measured in years) and highest level of schooling 
completed (captured by dummy variables for elementary school or for secondary or higher 
education) to proxy for human capital, and assume no change in these adults’ education levels in 
the wake of FCFA devaluation.16   
 Table 2 reports the technical inefficiency equation estimates.  Note that, even though we 
report the estimates separately, the stochastic production frontier and technical inefficiency 
equations are indeed estimated jointly.  Across all three years, those with little or no education 
and off-farm employment in agriculture have significantly lower technical inefficiency -- likely 
because of reciprocal labor sharing arrangements and learning from others on whose farms they 
work -- while the relatively well-educated who also work off-farm in the nonagricultural sector 
likewise exhibit greater technical efficiency.  There are significant differences in technical 
inefficiency across the three agroecological regions spanned by these data.  Farmers in the more 
humid forest and forest-savannah transition zones appear more efficient than those in the drier 
savannah zone.   
 The estimates reported in Table 2 largely confirm our hypotheses regarding the effects of 
the macroeconomic shock on plot-level technical inefficiency.  Education doesn’t shield 
people from the shock, as is apparent in the statistically insignificant estimates for the education 
variables and for the regressors interacting education and complexity.  The sole exception arises 
from the positive coefficient estimate on the interaction term for those with secondary school 
                                                          
16 In these data, almost 80 percent of plots were operated by farmers who had not completed elementary school.  
Only 15 percent had completed secondary school, and fewer than 2 percent had completed college.  If higher 
education leads to self-selection out of agriculture, so that farmers with higher educational attainment may actually 
possess below-average ability or work ethic for individuals of their education level, then there may be some  bias in 
the estimated effect of education on technical inefficiency, although we can control for this somewhat by including 
off-farm employment status among the regressors.  Our results may therefore err somewhat on the conservative side 
in making our point. 
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education and nonagricultural off-farm employment, a small subsample who have superior 
access to market information from their largely salaried jobs in the main market towns.  So that 
one exception to the general point makes sense.  Moreover, jointly, the education variables have 
no statistically significant effect on technical inefficiency in the immediate aftermath of the 
shock, as evidenced by a Wald test statistic (p-value) of 13.93 (0.2371), as reported in Table 3. 
 Subsequent recovery nonetheless appears greater for more experienced and educated 
operators, and the estimation results support this Schultzian hypothesis.  The human capital 
variables are jointly significant in the recovery phase -- Table 3 reports a Wald test statistic (p-
value) of 27.15 (0.0044) for the human capital variables in the 1994-1995 change in technical 
inefficiency -- where they were insignificant in the initial response to the devaluation shock.  
Technical inefficiency decreases significantly in farmer experience and sharply and significantly 
for those who have completed at least elementary education, with the effects greatest for those 
who also work off-farm.  Education appears most valuable for those with more complex 
operations, as indicated by the statistically significant, negative estimate for interaction term 
between secondary education and share of farm in modern varieties, although none of the other 
education-complexity interaction terms are statistically significantly different from zero.  Both 
the magnitude and sign of the point estimates and the statistical significance of these estimates 
support the Schultzian claim that education facilitates more rapid and substantial recovery. 
 Estimated inefficiency increases with operational complexity in the immediate aftermath 
of the shock, as reflected by negative and strongly statistically significant point estimates on the 
modern and crop-secondary education interaction terms. Although they are jointly significant in 
the initial effects of the shock (Wald test statistic (p-value) of 20.65 (0.0021)), the complexity 
variables are jointly statistically insignificant in the second stage recovery (Wald test statistic (p-
value) of 8.92 (0.1784)), suggesting that farm complexity basically conditions one’s initial 
exposure to a shock, but has little effect on the time path of recovery.  Relatively simple farms 
operated by relatively well-educated farmers therefore both suffer smaller technical inefficiency 
shocks in macroeconomic disequilibrium and recover from them more quickly, giving them a 
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significant competitive advantage in periods of macroeconomic disequilibrium. 
 Off-farm employment plainly matters to patterns of farm efficiency response to 
macroeconomic shocks, although the coefficient estimates in Table 2 suggest a pattern more 
complicated than we can fully explain here with these data.  Unlike the education or farm 
complexity variables, the off-farm employment variables have jointly statistically significant 
effects on both the 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 technical inefficiency changes. Initial change in 
technical inefficiency was lower for those with off-farm agricultural employment and for well-
educated farmers with nonagricultural off-farm employment, as reflected in positive and sizeable 
coefficient estimates. Those with off-farm agricultural employment had less improvement in 
1995, with the two effects almost perfectly offsetting each other, implying that farm workers 
have enjoyed a very transitory efficiency advantage over those who only work their own farm.  
Those with nonagricultural off-farm work, however, not only suffered smaller adverse initial 
inefficiency effects, but they also improved further in 1995, as reflected in a negative and 
statistically significant estimated effect among those with at least elementary education.  Future 
research might usefully explore these seemingly heterogeneous effects of off-farm employment 
on farm productivity, in order to establish to what extent these might relate to informational, 
financial liquidity, or labor timing differences across different types of off-farm employment.   
 Overall, the estimation results support the hypotheses advanced by our simple model.  
The macroeconomic shock of currency devaluation appears to have had a significant transitory 
effect on technical inefficiency felt most acutely among smallholders managing relatively 
complex operations.  The rate and extent of recovery, however, depends primarily on operator 
human capital, in the form of experience and education, on the complexity of the farming 
operation, and, in a complicated way, on off-farm employment status.   
 The point that education hastens one’s response to shocks but doesn’t shield one from 
them is a more nuanced finding than appears in the existing literature.  For example, Glewwe and 
Hall (1998), using 1985 and 1990 panel data from Peru, found that households with better 
educated heads were less vulnerable to the adverse effects of macroeconomic shocks.  But their 
 21
data did not permit them to establish whether it was the relatively more rapid speed of ex post 
adaptation or less initial exposure to the shock that accounted for the superior performance over 
five years among households with better educated heads.  Similarly, the “human capital approach 
to allocative efficiency” literature consistently found that education positively affects agricultural 
output, the allocative efficiency of farmers, or both (Griliches 1963, Welch 1970, 1978; Fane 
1975; Huffman 2002; Ram 1980).  But that literature failed to identify the context-dependent 
returns to education.  Education seems to pay off most in the wake of substantial disruptions to 
the economic environment and when the operation managed is relatively more complex.  Our 
analysis brings out these important refinements, offering empirical support to Schultz’s seminal 
claim that human capital enhances one’s ability to adapt to changing economic circumstances 
(Schultz 1964, 1975).  Of course we cannot tell in these data whether people who go far in 
school are inherently more adaptable or whether they learned something there that helps them 
adapt.  So while our results suggest education is important, one must keep in mind that education 
might merely proxy for unobserved human capital more generally. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 Macroeconomic shocks affect microeconomic decision-makers.  The short-run burden of 
collecting and processing information on which operators base resource reallocation decisions, 
and of finding new trading partners and negotiating new contracts may divert managerial 
attention from directly productive activities, leading to transitory increases in technical 
inefficiency and therefore to (perhaps temporary) deviations of output below its potential.  The 
disruption of the shock costs the economy aggregate output, but the effect is not uniformly 
experienced. 
 Rather, there are predictable cross-sectional differences across operators in the extent to 
which the shock diverts managerial attention and therefore in induced transitory inefficiency.  
Although education is no shield against the initial adverse effects of a shock, the pace and extent 
of subsequent recovery depends heavily on managerial human capital.  Managers with greater 
 22
experience and cognitive abilities process information more quickly and more accurately, 
enabling faster recovery from the initial impact of a shock.  So investment in universal education 
might bear dividends in the form of reduced foregone output in the wake of disruptive shocks, 
reinforcing the Schultzian argument that the returns to education increase as dynamic changes in 
the economy become greater or more frequent.  
 The magnitude of the technical inefficiency increases resulting from macroeconomic 
shocks appears greatest for those managing more complex operations and somewhat less for 
those who couple farming with off-farm employment.  This underscores the need for extension 
assistance to more complex, commercialized farms in times of sharp macroeconomic adjustment.  
It also reinforces previous findings on the importance of rural non-farm economy to performance 
in the agricultural sector and the need for policymakers to devote more time to understanding the 
complex farm-nonfarm relationship in rural communities (Reardon et al. 1992, 1998). 
 The literature on producer response to macroeconomic and sectoral shocks has yet to 
address these issues although they surely matter to short-run sectoral and macroeconomic 
performance and to the welfare of poor smallholder subpopulations.  Less well-educated 
smallholders and those who bear the domestic burdens of disequilibrium, chiefly women, fall 
behind their better-educated and less-encumbered counterparts.  These effects may help explain 
the sluggish response of agricultural output to policy shocks over the past two decades in much 
of the low-income world (Barrett and Carter 1999). 
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Table 1: Observed Changes in Prices and Input Applications 
(Percent change, 1993 to 1995) 
Prices (FMHS survey regions monthly 
average series) 
 
Nominal local rice variety price 47.9 
Local rice/yam price ratio 49.2 
Local rice price/wage ratio 16.8 
Input volumes (FMHS survey households)  
Area in rice 39.7 
Average plot size 12.8 
Adult family labor hours 28.0 
Hired labor hours 21.1 
Child labor hours 54.8 
Chemical inputs 5.0 
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Table 2: Technical Inefficiency Estimation Results 
 
 Unconditional 1993 Interactions 1995 Interactions 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error
Constant 0.8743 0.5639 -0.0167 0.5584 -0.4897 0.6150
Modern (Mod) 0.2724 0.2688 -1.5735*** 0.6112 0.0397 0.3331
Experience -0.0056 0.0185 -0.0333 0.0324 -0.0606** 0.0303
Married woman -0.0892 0.2560 -0.5761 0.7783 -0.1019 0.3439
Unmarried woman 0.4505 0.3443 -0.9456 0.9282 -0.6412 0.8355
Elementary edu. (Ele) 2.1209** 1.0621 -1.6600 1.0877 -2.4726* 1.2962
Secondary edu. + (Sec) 0.2128 0.6733 -0.8758 0.8554 -0.3876 0.9038
Crops (Crp) -0.0222 0.0876 0.1309 0.1341 0.1024 0.1134
Off-farm, non-ag work (Nag) 0.0884 0.2511 0.2367 0.3968 -0.3534 0.4688
Off-farm, ag work (Agw) -0.7268*** 0.3130 1.0879** 0.5123 1.0165* 0.5190
Mod x Ele 0.1496 0.6542 0.6859 1.0038 0.6896 0.8514
Crp x Ele -0.4347* 0.2619 0.4901 0.3840 0.5101 0.3642
Nag x Ele -0.2829 0.7799 0.2968 0.9795 -2.0355** 0.9282
Agw x Ele -1.2992 0.8850 0.2207 1.0233 3.0524*** 1.3039
Mod x Sec -0.0392 0.4469 0.0189 0.9336 -1.7961* 0.9502
Crp x Sec -0.1490 0.2177 -0.6929*** 0.2687 0.1848 0.3409
Nag x Sec -1.2367*** 0.5160 2.8514*** 0.6666 1.2352 0.7614
Agw x Sec 2.0102*** 0.6224 -0.1344 0.6858 -1.5815** 0.7997
Transition zone -1.4929*** 0.4366
EqForest zone -1.3595*** 0.3918
σ2 0.2116*** 0.0223
γ 0.8931*** 0.0289
Log-likelihood -10.6831
No. observations 464
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Wald Tests of Parameter Restrictions 
(p-value in parentheses) 
 
Null hypothesis degrees 
of 
freedom 
 
1993-1994 
 
1995-1994 
Complexity variables = 0 6 20.65 8.92 
  (0.0021) (0.1784) 
Human capital variables = 0 11 13.93 27.15 
  (0.2371) (0.0044) 
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Figure 1: Hypothesized Response Path to a Discrete Relative Price Shock 
 
 
Figure 2 : Evolution of stochastic rice prices 
(13-month centered moving average of regional series) 
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